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BOOKS

Belief and Language

tephen Carter. Tk Culture of Disbelief.
r\ew York: Basic Books, 1993, 277 pp.

In his book TM Culture ofDisbelief,
Yale law professor Stephen Carter
makes a powerful point about our
political culture's tendency to discount
any policy view that is infected with the
taint of religious motivation. In contexts as varied as the fights over public
rhool curricula, the problems in
accommodating religious beliefs in the
administration of the military and prisons, and the painful national struggle
"''ith life issues like abortion and
euthanasia, Professor Caner hammers
home the sensible notion that a policy
\1ew should be accepted or rejected on
Its own merits, without regard for its
moti\'ating source, religious or other"'ise.
All of this is based on the
premise that, in fact, American popular culture, in Caner's words, "con-

ifml/994

signs Americans who take their religion seriously to the lunatic fringe," an
assumption challenged by Michael
Kinsley in his review of the book in the
New Republic, who asks "Does anybody really think it's harder to stand
up in public, in 1993 America, and say
' I believe in God,' than it is to stand up
and say, 'I don't?'"
I think Kinsley and Carter are
both right-Kinsley in his insistence
that there is an expected, perhaps
even mandatory, level of subscription
to religious belief that serves as a baseline for popular discourse, and Carter
in his concern that any discernible
nod toward religion is one that
demeans the power of religion in people's lives, that, again Carter's words,
treats "God as a hobby." What troubles
me , though , is that Carter himself
seems unwilling to fully engage that
potential power as a force in discourse,
except when it fits with a predetermined set of rational justification principles. It seems to me that Carter has
bought into what I'll call the "Culture
of Rationality," and he carefully constrains his discussions accordingly.
Perhaps Carter himself has a fear of
being consigned to the lunatic fringe,
especiall} by the notoriously cynical
legal academy.
In a review of the book in First
Things, law profe sor Phillip Johnson
of Berkeley uses as a structural
metaphor this comment made by the
sociologist Peter Berger: "If India is
the most religious country in the

world, and Sweden the least religious,
then America is a nation of Indians
ruled by Swedes." Professor johnson
then notes Caner's "ambivalence
about whether he wants to be a Swede
or an Indian "-notably, Carter's conclusionary stance on the teaching of
creationism in schools as wrongheaded
because it's "shoddy science, not science at all, really." Moreover, this
apparent inconsistency runs through
much of the book; that is, o the one
hand Carter condemns the cultural
hostility toward religion while on the
other he dismisses in cursory fashion
the substance of views, like those of the
creationists, as ultimately unsound.
In my view, the crux of the problem can be seen in Carter's epistemological chapter (Ch. 11), in which he
successfully argues that the discomfort
with religiously-based claims stems
from
the inability of postEnlightenment thought to deal with
claims that don't fall into neat categories of facts vs. \"alues. For example,
the statement that there is life after
death is a factual claim, but isn't
testable by " cientific" mental observation. Carter faults the so-called liberal
mind for simply rejecting such a factual claim without accounting for what
might be a rational basis for making
it-namely, that it comports with plausible interpretation of the Bible. So,
according to Carter, religious claims
should not be triviali.£Cd as irrational
because they defy materialistic proof;
instead they may lay claim to "rational33

ity" because they are testable by reference to a text, God's word (even
though he is at great pains to repeat
his personal disagreement with many
Christian text-based claims). But
Carter's defense of the rationality of
religious claims itself rests on a notion
of rationality that presupposes the existence of some external confirmationeither material observation or a text.
Carter does not take, or even typically consider, the scarier epistemological step: that there may exist truth
for believers that is not testable by any
external means. Neither here, nor I
would guess in any other forum , is
there serious consideration given to
the epistemological possibility of
knowledge that is not "rational" in the
sense of being testable by external
forces. Ironically, too, it may be precisely the "irrational" aspects of religious life that believers who might be
expected to reject religion in this technologically sophisticated and highly
cynical culture find most compelling.
It's not surprising that Carter
doesn't take on such precarious epistemological issues. Being called irrational is about the worst epithet that
one can level at one's opponent in
serious debate, especially in the legal
academy. And here it may be worth
considering whether it's especially
hard for people whose gender or race
h as historically been considered less
"rational" to champion serious consideration of notions that fall outside
comfortable post-Enlightenment dialogue. For women and people of color,
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whose membership in the cult of rationality was hard-won, there are considerable risks to challenging that structure. But until we do, we cannot be satisfied that our culture is really taking
our religion seriously.
Laura Gaston Dooley

Walter L. Reed, Dialogues of the Word:
The Bible as Literature According to
Bakhtin. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993.
The last fifteen years have witnessed growing dialogue between
schools of Biblical and literary criticism as Biblical studies have explored
questions of genre, imagery, and narrative. These years have also seen
increasing employment of the ideas
and concepts of the Russian thinker
and literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin,
who spent much of his life examining
the dialogical nature of language.
Walter R. Reed weaves these trends in
his fine and timely study of the
Hebrew Bible and New Testament,
Dialogues ofthe.Word.
Approaching the Bible as a literary scholar, Reed situates himself
between the poles of historical and
theological readings. The historical
approach, Reed argues, em phasizes
the Bible's fragmentary quality, its
"multiple sources and layers of redaction" (167), or, to use Bakhtin's term,
its centrifugal thrust. The theological
seeks to preserve the centripetal: it
consolidates by emphasizing the unity
of scripture's revelation. A literary
reading "notes the tensions between
the assertions of discord and assertions
of concord" (169), but seeks finally to
locate "particular sites of coherence"(l70) within the Biblical antholo-

gy.
Why turn to Bakhtin in such
work? Reed offers three reasons.
Bakhtin himself analyzes and celebrates the struggle between unifying
and dispersive tendencies within utterance and text. Second, Bakhtin
"acknowledg[es] different historical
'layers' within any uttterance," and so
is especially useful in approaching the
process of canon formation (15).
Third, one of the central themes of
both the Hebrew Bible and New
Testament is God's dialogue with His
people, and, as a rich theorist of dialogue, Bakhtin offers much in the
approach to this dialogue.
Indeed, Bakhtin proves to be of
valuable assistance in Reed's learned,
detailed chapters. In one chapter, he
employs Bakhtin 's concept of the
chronotope to analyze the significance
of particular contexts of time and
place, three "paradigms of communication" in the H ebrew Bible: law,
prophecy, and wisdom ( 47). The
books of the law, for example, transpire in the liminal space of wandering, the wilderness. There, the image
of the "house of God" is found in the
tabernacle, its portable character
reflecting the law's "lack of geographical fixity" (68). Later, therefore, the
prophetic books criticize "the false
sense of security" the people feel once
the house of God is located in the temple. Finally, in books of wisdom such
as Proverbs and Job, the house of God
is "creation itself.. . a cosmic dwelling
built by God for all his creatures" (72).
Reed presents an extensive and
splendid analysis of Job in a separate
chapter and illuminates much in this
puzzling, mysterious book. The author
of Job questions all three of the above
authoritative genres as law, prophecy,
and wisdom are conflated into a "discourse of justice." Job's author rejects
such discourse as it "rests on the concept of a covenant or treaty with specific requirements" (128). Yahweh ' s
voice from the whirlwind, and Job's
The Cresstl

